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In this paper I study empirically the industry and firm characteristics that
determine the level of corporate antitakeover protection. I find that the
level of antitakeover protection is negatively associated with the level of
firm-specific organizational capital and with stock market volatility. On the
other hand, firms that allow a larger degree of antitakeover protection to
their managers do indeed invest more in long term projects and operate in
more concentrated industries. All these findings are consistent with a 
managerial entrenchment interpretation of corporate antitakeover
provisions.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate anti-takeover provisions (CAP) are used extensively and can be found in 
public companies worldwide
1. Corporations restrict shareholder rights to obstruct 
potential hostile take-over attempts that in case of success could overthrow the firm 
management team. Firm managers might defend their self-interest when introducing 
these types of provisions in the corporate statutes. Yet, it is still the case that 
shareholders need to approve these statute changes. Why do shareholders vote in favor 
of CAP? Or assuming that these statutes are already in place, what refrain shareholders 
not to eliminate them?  
 
One possible explanation comes from a managerial entrenchment view of the 
corporation: Ownership of public companies is dispersed and small shareholders free 
ride on the effort of others to obtain costly information needed to monitor the 
managerial team. As a consequence of this free rider problem, shareholders do not 
properly control managerial actions and managers enjoy considerable discretion 
whether in running the corporation, appointing the members of board of directors or 
even in approving these anti-takeover statutes. 
 
Yet, an alternative explanation could be that these antitakeover statutes increase firm 
value by encouraging an efficient allocation of resources and therefore shareholders are 
rationally willing to vote for them. Previous work has pointed out a number of different 
arguments that go in this direction that I summarize below. Our goal in this paper is to 
explore the empirical content and plausibility of some of these alternative value-
enhancing mechanisms in contrast to the empirical implications derived from 
managerial entrenchment types of explanation.  
 
Note that the outcome of this line of research is relevant to a much wider audience than 
the one exclusively composed by the subset of the academic community always willing 
to increase their stock of knowledge about these issues. The conclusions of this research 
could have policy implications regarding how corporate governance should be 
regulated. In particular, if I can not find any empirical support for efficiency reasons to 
establish CAP, if all empirical evidence points out that the only purpose of these 
provisions is to allow managers to expropriate shareholder rents; should not the 
authorities limit their use or even prohibit its presence in corporate statutes?
2 
 
Recent research has found strong empirical evidence in favor of the managerial view 
type of explanation. A low level of shareholder￿s rights seems to decrease firm market 
value
3. However, CAP could still have value-enhancing effects in some concrete 
situations even if on average these positive effects do not compensate the value 
reduction consequences due to managerial entrenchment. In this paper, I investigate 
further the empirical implications of different proposed efficiency reasons behind CAP 
versus the implications of a managerial entrenchment point of view of CAP.  
 
                                                 
1 See for example Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) for US and Santana and Aguiar (2004) for European 
corporations. 
2 Easterbrook and Fischel (1981) advocate rules that would prevent managers from reacting to takeover 
bids. 
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In particular, I investigate the nature of the relationship between CAP and three 
variables: organizational capital, product market competition and long run corporate 
investment policies. For each one of these variables, I utilize previous literature to find 
contradictory empirical implications depending if CAP have been installed because 
efficiency or managerial entrenchment considerations. 
 
First, CAP could be a device to promote managerial firm-specific investments. 
Managers may lack the incentives to invest time and effort in firm specific human 
capital unless they know ex-ante that shareholders are not going to appropriate ex-post 
the returns of this type of investments. Provisions that make harder for shareholders to 
fire the manager might increase ex-post managerial bargaining power and therefore give 
incentives to increase managerial firm-specific investments. If I assume that those firms 
with more organizational capital require more firm specific managerial investment, an 
empirical content of this argument would be that those firms with more organizational 
capital are more likely to present a high level of CAP.  
 
On the contrary, from a managerial entrenchment perspective, CAP would allow more 
managerial slack through the isolation from the discipline of the market for corporate 
control. More managerial slack would translate in less development of firm specific 
organizational capital. Therefore, from a managerial entrenchment point of view, I 
would predict a non-positive relation between en organizational capital and CAP. 
 
We try to measure organizational capital with different proxies. Simple measures are 
market to book ratio or R&D to sales ratio. More complicated measures require the 
complete estimation of a firm production function to identify organizational capital as 
the time-invariant Slow-type residual. For all measures I try without exception, I find 
that those firms with more organizational capital provide less instead of more take-over 
defense provisions. I conclude that there is no evidence that firms that decrease 
shareholder rights to provide the incentives for firm-specific managerial investments. 
     
Second, if I adopt a managerial entrenchment perspective, I should take into 
consideration those variables that could make managerial entrenchment especially 
costly for the corporation and its shareholders. Competition in the product market might 
increase the cost of managerial slack since marginal managerial productivity would be 
larger in competitive markets. Therefore, companies in competitive industries will be 
less likely to pass CAP that allow its managers to become entrenched and as a 
consequence less productive. This is a clear empirical implication for the managerial 
entrenchment perspective whereas up to our knowledge there are no pure efficiency 
considerations that could link CAP and product market competition. In our empirical 
analysis, I do indeed find a negative association between product market competition 
and the importance of CAP. This also supports a managerial entrenchment 
interpretation of CAP. 
  
The last
4 efficiency argument departs from the usual assumption of perfect capital 
markets. Managers could have better information than capital markets to evaluate 
                                                 
4 There is an additional interesting relation that we do not investigate in this paper. CAP could provide 
more managerial on the job security in return for lower total managerial compensation. These restrictions 
of shareholder rights might imply a lower total price for the managerial input. From a managerial 
entrenchment point of view the empirical prediction would again be the opposite, more entrenched 
managers will tend to increase their own compensation. Fahlenbrach (2003) explore this possibility and IE Working Paper                                    WP04/28                                15/10/2004 
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different investment decisions. This asymmetric information problem could be more 
pronounced for investments whose potential profitability depends on a long run horizon 
since in this case uncertainty is larger (Stein (1988)). If markets systematically under-
price long term projects, managers subject to the discipline of the market for corporate 
control have an incentive to behave myopically and focus too much in short term 
earnings in detriment of the overall profit maximizing allocation of resources. However, 
if managers are protected from short-term pressures, the stock market under-valuation 
of long-term projects may have little effect on manager ·s behavior and managerial 
myopia might no longer exist. Taking this reasoning into account, CAP could be a 
device to solve an inefficiency and promote an optimal long-term investment policy and 
therefore a positive relation between long-term investment and CAP would be 
consistent with a value-enhancing justification for CAP. 
 
From a managerial entrenchment perspective, managers could use its strong position to 
engage in building empire policies that might induce them to over-invest in long-live 
assets. Therefore the empirical implication from the entrenchment perspective also 
predicts a positive relation between CAP and investment in long-lived assets. 
 
We show how in our sample firms that allow a larger degree of protection invest in 
assets with a larger useful life. This finding is consistent both with efficiency and 
managerial entrenchment justifications for CAP and therefore I proceed a step further. I 
investigate how the stock market values corporations that invest in longer-lived versus 
short-lived assets both contemporaneously and in the future. If stock market values 
myopically long run investment, I should observe that companies that follow this 
investment policy should have a market penalization in the time period they indeed 
invest but a market premium some years after the investment has been made. I show 
how companies that invest in long-lived assets have a penalty the period they commit 
the investment but also many years after. This finding contradicts the hypothesis of 
myopic stock market and therefore supports once more a managerial entrenchment 
interpretation of CAP. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 I briefly review the literature 
about the topic. Section 3 describes our data and the process I have used to construct our 
variables. I show our results in section 4, while Section 5 concludes and discusses the 
limitations of the study.  
 
1. Literature  Review 
 
What is the effect of corporate antitakeover provisions? We can easily identify two 
broad opposite views in the literature. On one hand these provisions could worsen the 
principal agent problem between managers and shareholders through isolating the 
managerial function from the discipline provided by the market for corporate control. 
According to this view, these provisions clearly destroy shareholders· value. As I 
explain below, the proponents of this negative opinion have accumulated a substantial 
body of evidence in support of this assertion. On the other hand, other subset of the 
literature defends the value-enhancing characteristic of antitakeover provisions. I review 
them in detail below.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
again his findings support CAP as a managerial entrenchment devices. Those companies with larger 
managerial compensation have more instead of fewer
4 takeover defenses. IE Working Paper                                    WP04/28                                15/10/2004 
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Up to our knowledge, the literature has found consistent evidence that corporate 
antitakeover measures is consistent with practices that destroy shareholder￿s value with 
the exception of Linn and McConnell (1983) that report an increase in stock prices 
when antitakeover amendments are approved. 
 
Bertrand and Mullinathan (1999a) report that the adoption of antitakeover statutes 
weakened managers· incentives to minimize labor costs. Garvey and Hanka (1999) 
conclude that antitakeover statutes ￿allow managers to pursue goals other than 
maximizing shareholder wealth￿ while Borokhovich, Brunarski and Parrino (1997) find 
a positive association between antitakeover corporate protection provisions and total 
managerial compensation.  
 
Bebchuk, Coates and Subramania (2003) report a first order negative effect of takeover 
defenses on shareholders wealth. They find that those targets of a hostile takeover 
attempt with larger corporate defense provisions are more likely to remain independent. 
As a consequence, their shareholders lose significant abnormal returns from the 
acquisition premium. Bebchuk (2002) surveys the literature to make a strong case 
against the board veto in corporate takeovers.  
 
More related to this paper, Gomper, Ishii and Metrick (2003) construct an index of 
corporate antitakeover protection -which I will later use- that summarizes information 
from corporate statutes and state antitakeover arrangements. They find that a larger 
level of corporate antitakeover protection is related to lower equity returns, lower profit 
margins and lower sales growth. Moreover, they find that managers that enjoy a larger 
level of antitakeover protection are more likely to engage in empire-building activities 
like capital expenditures and corporate acquisitions. 
 
On the opposite side of this debate
5, Lipton and Rowe (2002) argue that managers have 
better information than shareholders about the real long run value of the company. In 
light of this, managers can add value to the shareholders by rejecting takeover attempts 
whose offer is inferior to the real long run value of the company. However, Bebchuk, 
Coates 4 and Subramanian (2003) do find substantial superior long run shareholder 
returns for those companies that accept rather than reject a hostile takeover attempt. 
 
Alternatively, these antitakeover provisions could enlarge shareholders· joint bargaining 
power and thus increase the premium paid in acquisitions. Shareholders could be 
dispersed and these antitakeover provisions would allow managers to act as a single 
agent in behalf of shareholders and therefore obtain better financial conditions
6. Yet, 
Bebchuk, Coates and Subramanian (2003) find no statistically significant premium for 
those acquired targets with staggered boards. 
 
We can conclude from this literature review that there is a strong body of evidence that 
find that antitakeover provisions destroy shareholder￿s value. At the same time, some 
value-enhancing arguments in favor of antitakeover provisions are not supported by the 
data. In section 2 I discuss other potential efficiency reasons to introduce anti-takeover 
provisions and I test its empirical validity in section 3. 
 
                                                 
5 Bebchuk (2002) surveys all efficiency arguments in favor of the existence of board veto. This section 
has relied on this Survey extensively. 
6 See for example Stultz (1988). IE Working Paper                                    WP04/28                                15/10/2004 
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2. Analytical  Framework 
 
In this section I discuss distinct implications of a managerial entrenchment versus a 
value-enhancing device interpretation of CAP. As I detail below, both views have 
different predictions regarding the relationship of CAP with three different variables: 
organizational capital, product market competition and long run investment policies. I 
explore and state these empirical implications in the form of contradictory hypothesis 
that will be tested in section 3. 
 
2.1. Organizational capital and Corporate Antitakeover Provisions (CAP) 
Organizational capital and CAP as a corporate value-enhancing device 
 
Economists have been studying extensively the different implications of the existence of 
firm-specific human capital since Becker (1962) introduced the analysis of on the job 
specific investments. These investments are those whose marginal productivity is lower 
outside rather than inside the firm. In the extreme case, if these investments are entirely 
firm specific, they have no effect on productivity that would be useful in other firms. 
Given this characteristic, no rational employee would be willing to invest in firm 
specific human capital unless the firms incur in all the burden of these investments
7. 
 
For the particular case of the managerial function, these firm specific investments could 
consist in a wide variety of concepts like investments in better knowledge of the 
coordination and production processes particular to the corporation
8; investments in 
better knowledge of the different organization individuals
9 and / or corporate business 
units; and more generally speaking, they could consist in any investment in the 
development of managerial resources and capabilities whose productivity outside the 
firm is lower than inside. 
 
We can see the same idea from a different perspective considering a multi-task 
managerial job in which managers have to allocate their time between two possible 
tasks. Both managerial tasks create value for the corporation but while one task 
generates firm-specific skills or capabilities the other produces a more general type of 
managerial skills. Under mild conditions, it is straightforward to see that managers will 
have an incentive to invest more time or effort in the task that is not firm specific 
because it increases more the value of the managerial outside option and therefore 
increases more total managerial wealth.  
 
For example, consider a situation in which managers have to decide the allocation of a 
fixed amount of time between two managerial tasks. In one of them, managers spend 
time talking and interacting directly to the firm employees and these conversations 
allow the managers to acquire a better knowledge of their employees￿ skills and 
capabilities. As a result they can make a better allocation of employees at the different 
company jobs and/or hierarchy levels. Alternatively, managers can spend time and 
effort in representing the firm interests in different events favorable to build a network 
                                                 
7 For a detailed analysis see Becker (1964) pp 40-50.  
8 See for example the organizational routines described in Nelson and Winter (1982). 
9  For example in Prescott and Visscher (1982) the firm ￿naturally ￿learns about the different skills of its 
employees when employee tenure increases. If managers need to spend time and exert some effort to 
observe and infer the different skill of its employees this would be an example of firm-specific investment 
since this managerial knowledge is useless outside the firm. IE Working Paper                                    WP04/28                                15/10/2004 
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of contacts that create value for the company but that additionally improve the potential 
of a future managerial career outside the organization. Firm owners cannot observe nor 
monitor the allocation of managerial time between tasks
10. In this framework, managers 
will have an incentive to devote more time to the second task to the detriment of the 
amount of time dedicated to the firm-specific task since the more general task increases 
the value assigned to the manager in the external labor market while the firm-specific 
task does not. For this reason, the general task increases the managerial bargaining 
power more than what the firm-specific task does. 
 
As a consequence of the previous argument, managers will have an incentive to over-
invest/under-invest in managerial tasks that produce general / firm-specific skills or 
capabilities. One possible way to mitigate this problem could be to introduce CAP. By 
construction, these provisions make less likely that managers will have to depart from 
their current company. Therefore, managers will have fewer incentives to neglect those 
managerial tasks that generate firm-specific capabilities. For this reason, CAP could 
increase total firm profits. 
 
Under a value-enhancing interpretation of CAP, those corporations in which firm 
specific organizational capital play a larger role will be more likely to introduce CAP in 
their statutes. The key implicit assumption is that the marginal productivity of 
managerial firm-specific capabilities is larger in those organizations with more 
organizational capital. 
 
Organizational capital and CAP as a managerial entrenchment device 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1989) present an argument that could yield the exactly opposite 
prediction to the one above: According to their paper, managers could invest in 
managerial projects that are specific to their human capital. Proceeding in this way, 
firm-specific organizational capital is also going to be manager-specific and managers 
will be more entrenched precisely in those firms with more organizational capital. As a 
consequence, corporate anti-takeover provisions could be less necessary in those firms 
with more firm-specific capital since managers already enjoy some degree of on-the-job 
security. 
 
Also, I could argue from a managerial entrenchment point of view that CAP allows a 
larger degree of managerial slack and as a consequence managers neglect the 
construction or maintenance of organizational capital. Therefore in the data I should 
observe larger CAP associated with a lower level of organizational capital. Following a 
different argument derived from a managerial entrenchment interpretation, the 
implication is a negative relation between organization capital and CAP: 
 
Summarizing the last paragraphs, I have two opposite predictions regarding the 
relationship between firm specific organizational capital and CAP depending which 
view about CAP I use. Which interpretation describes reality more accurately is an 
empirical matter that I examine below: A positive relationship would support an 
efficiency reason behind corporate anti-takeover provisions while a negative one would 
support CAP as a managerial entrenchment device. 
 
                                                 
10 Alternatively we could assume that firm owners imperfectly observe managerial behavior. IE Working Paper                                    WP04/28                                15/10/2004 
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2.2. Product Market Competition and CAP  
Product market competition and CAP as a corporate value-enhancing device 
 
Up to our knowledge, there does not exist in the literature reasons that consider CAP as 
a value-enhancing device and at the same time predict some type of relation of either 
sign between CAP and product market competition.  
 
Product market competition and CAP as a managerial entrenchment device 
  
Competition in the product market might increase the cost of managerial slackness since 
marginal managerial productivity would be larger in competitive markets (See Raith 
(2003)). Therefore, companies in competitive industries will be less likely to pass CAP 
that allow its managers to become entrenched. If not, the combination of managerial 
slack and competitive markets could have strong negative effects for the corporation. 
From this point of view, I would expect a negative relation between CAP and product 
market competition. 
 
2.3. Long-term investment policies and CAP 
Long-term investment policies CAP as a corporate value-enhancing mechanism 
device 
 
Managers could have better information than capital markets to evaluate different 
investment projects. Additionally, this information could be hard to transmit to analysts 
either because processing this information requires firm specific knowledge that it is 
costly to obtain or because the total disclosure of information could put into risk the 
success of the investment due to strategic considerations. This asymmetric information 
problem could be more severe for long-term investments where the uncertainty 
surrounding the projects is larger and the strategic considerations more important. 
 
As a consequence of the previous argument capital markets might have more problems 
to correctly evaluate long term rather than short-term projects. If this is the case, long 
run projects might depress share prices even if they are good investment decisions that 
maximize shareholder ·s wealth. As a result, managers that engage corporate resources 
in projects whose profitability require a long run horizon could be more likely to lose 
their job.  
 
Depressed stock prices might provoke hostile takeovers attempts that might be 
successful resulting in the paradox of managers losing control of the company even if 
managerial actions were entirely aligned with shareholders long-term interests. The 
equilibrium result of this effect would be a natural reluctance of managers to long-term 
investments. Therefore, unprotected managers might have an incentive to allocate less 
than optimal amount of resources to long-term investments
11. Under this perspective, 
anti-takeover corporate provisions could be a device to solve this inefficiency and 
promote an optimal long-term investment policy. Firms that invest more in long-term 
projects will allow a larger degree of anti-takeover protection to their managers 
  
Long-term investment policies and CAP as a managerial entrenchment device 
 
                                                 
11 This argument is developed in Stein (1988) IE Working Paper                                    WP04/28                                15/10/2004 
    8
Managers isolated from the discipline of the market for corporate control might be more 
likely to engage in empire building activities (Jensen (1986)). Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 
(2003) indeed find that corporations with substantial antitakeover protection present a 
larger level of capital expenditures. In this context, one more dimension of managerial 
empire building could be over-investment in longer-lived assets. Note that this line of 
reasoning implies the same prediction as the one I derived when considering CAP a 
value-enhancing mechanism that serves the purpose of providing the ￿right￿ managerial 
incentives for the efficient long-term investment policy. As a result, up to this point, 
both views of long-term investments are observationally equivalent. 
 
Yet, I can still differentiate between both hypotheses if the stock market over or 
undervalues long term investments. For this purpose, I design a test that measures how 
the stock market reacts to long-term investment both when the investment is made and 
some years after. The strategy is straightforward: if the stock market is myopic, a 
portfolio of companies that invest in longer-lived assets more than the average company 
would present negative abnormal returns when the investment is made but instead it 
would earn positive abnormal returns some years after; once the payoffs of this type of 
long term investment increase the cash flow of the company at apparently no cost. I 
explain in detail the construction of these portfolios as well as the results in Section 3. 
 
3. Data and Variable Description 
 
We combine data from four different sources. From Compustat Industrial (1982-2001), 
I take corporate information for all US public companies; from Compustat Segment 
(1982-2001) I get business segment data. Finally, I incorporate the Corporate 
Governance Index from the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). I cross the 
information from the three data sets using the company ticker. Table I show the 
descriptive statistics of the variables I will use later in the analysis 
 
Most variables I use in the next section do not deserve further explanation since they 
come directly from the above-mentioned sources without further manipulation. 
However, some of them require a construction process that I explain in detail below. 
 
Governance Index  
 
We use as a measure of shareholder rights the index constructed by Gompers, Ishii and 
Metrick (2003), from now on GIM. This Corporate Governance Index summarizes 
information of 24 distinct corporate-governance provisions for approximately 1700 
firms. GIM identify five different groups of rules: tactics for delaying hostile bidders; 
shareholders rights in elections or charter/bylaw amendments; director/officer 
protection, other takeover defenses and state laws. The index is constructed by adding 
one point for every provision that restricts shareholder rights/increases managerial 
power. Examples of these corporate provisions are: poison pills, indemnification 
contracts to the managers or supermajority rules to approve a hostile takeover. For more 
and detailed information of the construction of this Corporate Governance Index see the 
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Industry Concentration Index 
 
For operational purposes, I define industry as a four-digit SIC code. I compute total 
industry sales in a given year by adding all sales of all business units that operate in that 
particular industry that given year according to how public corporations report it. Note 
that this measure of industry sales includes sales from all public companies that report 
operations exclusively in a single four digit SIC code and segment sales corresponding 
to those divisions of diversified firms that report operations in the same four-digit SIC 
code. Once I have constructed this measure of total industry sales I compute the 







Where si represents the company (or individual segment) market share and is equal to 
individual company (or individual segment) sales over total industry sales. For example, 
if in a given four digit SIC code XXXX in the year 2001 there is one non-diversified 
company with total sales equal to 300 million and two divisions of diversified 
companies one division that reports 300 millions in sales and the other division 








We measure industry volatility by the weighted average of firm volatility. The 
corporations I use for constructing this measure only operate in one industry, this is, 
they report operations just in a single segment. The weights I use are the market share of 
each segment as I have described just above. The measure of individual firm volatility is 




The task of measuring organizational capital represents a considerable challenge. I use 
up to three different proxies to try to capture this elusive concept. Each particular proxy 
taken in isolation arises some suspicious about what it is really measuring. However, as 
I will show later, our empirical results do not change with the proxies of organizational 
capital I use and therefore I feel confident that I are capturing the main effect of 
organizational capital on the restriction of shareholder rights. 
 
The first proxy I use is simply the market value to book value ratio. This ratio has 
already been widely used in the literature for this purpose. The assumption is that the 
excess value of the company over the value of its assets captures the firm organizational 
capital. However, it is widely accepted that this ratio also captures other variables like 
future expectation of firm growth or profitability. Furthermore, this ratio varies 
systematically across industries and I need to have this in mind if I want to use it to 
identify firm specific organization capital.  
  
Our second proxy for firm organizational capital also uses the market to book ratio but 
modified in a certain way that tries to overcome the above-mentioned drawbacks. I 
propose the following specification for a given company i: 
 IE Working Paper                                    WP04/28                                15/10/2004 
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  log(MV)it = Ii + Tt + α logBVit + logOi + eit           (1) 
 
Where MV represents firm market value, I captures industry fixed effects, T stands for 
year fixed effects, α  is a coefficient to be estimated, BV is the book value of firm assets, 
O is organization capital and e represents other unobservable variables that I assume has 
expected value of zero and that they are statistically independent of the explanatory 
variables. 
We estimate (1) running a regression with market value as dependent variable and book 
value, industry dummies and year dummies as independent variables. I obtain O by 
computing the average across time of the residual of the regression. This is our second 
proxy of organization capital. I use Compustat Annual information for the 21-year 
period 1982-2002. Since not all firms are present the whole 21 year-period, I restrict the 
sample to take into account only those companies that have at least five annual 
observations. I display the estimation of this preliminary regression in Table II. 
Our third proxy of organization capital assumes the following specification that assumes 
a Cobb-Douglas firm production function: 
 
 
log(Sales)it = Ii + Tt + α logKit +β  logLit + logOi + eit      (2) 
 
where Sales represents total firm sales, K is firm total capital, α  and β  are coefficients to 
be estimated, L is total number of firm employees while I,  T and e keep the same 
terminology as immediately above. I estimate (2) and find the estimate of firm 
organization capital following exactly the same steps as I did above. This is, I run a 
regression with log sales as dependent variable and firm employees, firm assets, 
industry and year dummies as independent variables. The results of this preliminary 
regression can be found in Table 2. Firm specific organizational capital is computed as 
the time-invariant part of e. 
 
Estimated average useful life of company assets 
 
Lewellen-Badrinath (1997), from now on LB, propose an algorithm that estimates the 
replacement value of company assets used when computing the denominator of Tobin￿s 
Q. As the first steps of their algorithm, they find endogenously an estimation of the 
economic
12 useful life of company assets. I will use this first step as our measure of 
estimated average useful life of company assets. 
Although the LB procedure relies just in general accounting rules, the whole process 
can be quite cumbersome to follow. Therefore, I will first explain its logic with a simple 
example whose main features are detailed in Table 3. Assume a new company is created 
the thirty first of December of 1990 with new capital investment whose value is equal to 
10. All capital equipment has a homogeneous asset life of five years. Assume for 
simplicity that all investment in capital equipment is actually done the last day of each 
year. Table 3 depicts the series of investments in capital equipment until 1996 and the 
corresponding accounting of different items: gross book value, depreciation, 
accumulated depreciation and net book value of the capital equipment. Note that in 
reality I may not observe the investment in new capital equipment but I do observe 
gross and net book value, annual depreciation and accumulated depreciation. From this 
                                                 
12 As opposed to accounting useful life of the assets. IE Working Paper                                    WP04/28                                15/10/2004 
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data I want to infer the estimated useful life of the asset. First I reconstruct the series of 
company capital investments, note that in Table 3 the following relation is satisfied: 
 
It =  ∆NBVt + Dt           ( 3 )  
 
where I is investment in new capital equipment, ∆NBVt is increase in net book value 
while Dt is annual depreciation. Once I have the series of It then note that I can recover 
the useful life of the asset by finding the N that satisfies: 
 
Σ i=0 
N-1  (IT-i ) = GBVT           ( 4 )  
 
where GBV represents gross book value of the assets. 
For example in Table 3 if I want to recover the estimated useful life of the capital 
equipment in use in 1995 I have just to add back the series of investments until I get the 
gross book value of the assets equal to 40. In this case I need to add five years of 
investments (40 = 5+5+10+0+20) and therefore I will correctly infer the economic 
useful life of the assets.  
This procedure has a number of problems, one can be immediately observed in Table 
III. If I want to compute the estimated useful life of the assets starting in 1996, I will 
add the investments until I get the gross book value of the assets in this year equal to 30. 
Note that in this way I will add 10+5+5+10 to get an incorrect asset useful life equal to 
4 years. The reason for this error is that in 1992 the company did not make any 
investment in capital equipment. Generally speaking, this procedure incorrectly 
estimates (N-x) instead of N as the useful life of the assets in place at time t whenever 
investment in capital equipment is zero at t- (N-1), t-(N-2),￿,t-(x-1). However, I 
believe that this is not going to constitute a serious problem in our data since most 
observations have investment different than zero. 
Another problem in this procedure is that (3) is only satisfied when the net book value 
of the retired assets is equal to zero. As I show below, (3) is satisfied if and only if the 
gross book value of the retired assets is equal to the accumulated depreciation. However 
if the corporation sells capital equipment before it has been totally depreciated I are 
going to under-estimate It and as a consequence over-estimate N. To see this I follow 
LB and consider the following accounting identities: 
GBVt = GBVt-1 + It ￿R
BV t               ( 5 )  
 
ADt = ADt-1 ￿Rt +Dt               ( 6 )  
 
Where AD accounts for accumulated depreciation, I investment, D annual depreciation, 
R accumulated depreciation of retired assets and R
BV acquisition cost of retired assets. 
Note that R
BV =R+bv where bv is the net accounting value of the retired assets. Note 
also NBV = GBV-AD. Combining  (5) and (6) I can get  
 
It =  NBVt ￿ NBVt-1 + Dt   + bvt            ( 7 )  
 
Thus, (3) is satisfied if and only if bv =0. 
 
Note that this last problem could be avoided if I could observe indeed the real series of 
investments made by the company. Indeed, Compustat reports this information  in the IE Working Paper                                    WP04/28                                15/10/2004 
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item Property, Plant and Equipment Capital Expenditures
13. This item ￿represents the 
funds used for addition to property, plant and equipment, excluding amounts arising 
from acquisitions for an operating segment￿
14. I compute the estimated useful life of the 
assets using both procedures to compute the series of investments. One deducting 
investment as in BL above and the other taking as investments the amount reported by 
the company in Property, Plant and Equipment Capital Expenditures. 
Summary of the procedure:  
1.  We have computed the series of company investment It using two different 
mechanisms. In the first one I take directly investment in Property, Plant and 
Equipment as reported by the company in the item Property, Plant and 
Equipment Capital Expenditures
15. This item ￿represents the funds used for 
addition to property, plant and equipment, excluding amounts arising from 
acquisitions for an operating segment￿
16. As a second approach I compute the 
series of company investments by finding the year increase in the book value of 
Property, Plant and Equipment net of depreciation
17  




N  (IT-t ) ≥   GBVt       ( 8 )  
 
3.  From procedures 1 and 2 I have an estimation of the useful life of the assets NT 
for all years in which the company is in Compustat. I exclude from the sample those 
companies from which I have less than five-year observations. I compute the average of 
NT across years. This average is our estimation of the useful life of company assets. 
For both procedures I use information extracted from Compustat for the period 1960-
2002. Note that I are unable to find an estimate of the useful life of assets for those 
companies that the sum of investments never adds to the total gross book value of 
property, plant and equipment. In this way I cannot assign an estimated useful life of 
assets among others of those companies that have gone public in relatively recent years. 
Both ways of computing the historical series of company investments give similar 
results in terms of descriptive statistics and number of missing observations. Table 1 
shows the descriptive statistics of the estimated useful life of the assets using the two 
different methods. The average estimated useful life of company property, plant and 




Sample and Controls 
 
We control for firm size since in large companies moral hazard and the monitoring 
problem is potentially worse (Demsetz and Lehn (1985)). Additionally, I control for 
industry volatility because it may affect managerial productivity increasing the cost of 
managerial slack (Prendergast (2002)). Finally, I control by firm rate of return on assets 
(ROA) since I want to differentiate the effect of organizational capital on CAP from the 
effect of performance.  
                                                 
13 Data30 in Compustat. 
14 See Compustat Manual page 216. 
15 Data30 in Compustat. 
16 See Compustat Manual page 216. 
17 Data7 in Compustat. IE Working Paper                                    WP04/28                                15/10/2004 
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Since the Corporate Governance Index constructed by GIM has a small time variation 
(see GIM (2003)) I just use the cross section corresponding to the year 2002 while the 
rest of the variables correspond to the values of the year 2001. Table 1 shows the 
descriptive statistics of the variables I use in the regressions. 
 
Regressions 
Table 4 displays the results of a ordinary least square regression of governance index 
over different measures of in-company organizational capital, firm volatility, industry 
concentration and two controls: firm size, and firm ROA. I show the regressions both 
with and without industry dummies corresponding to four digit SIC code but the results 
are qualitatively the same. 
Without exception, all measures of organizational capital are strongly negatively 
correlated with the corporate governance index. Firms with more organizational capital 
protect less their executives. This contradicts an efficiency reason of antitakeover 
reasons to promote firm-specific managerial investment and supports a managerial 
entrenchment point of view. This result would support indirectly Shleifer and Vishny 
(1989). Firms with more organizational capital are less attractive targets and thus their 
managers do not need corporate provisions that protect them from hostile takeover 
attempts. 
Table 4 displays how industry volatility is negatively correlated with defensive take-
over provisions. In non-reported results firm volatility is similarly negatively correlated 
with the corporate governance index
18. Additionally, note that the industry 
concentration measure is positively and significantly related to the managerial 
protection index. When product market competition is weaker, companies allow a larger 
degree of takeover defenses to their managers. More competitive markets protect less 
their managers from the discipline of the market for corporate control. 
The regressions in Table 4 have a potential technical problem. Since the industry 
concentration ratio variable is the same for all those firms operating in the same 
industry, the standard error of the ordinary least squares estimator are potentially biased 
upwards and as a consequence I can not trust the statistical significance of the 
coefficient. Because of this problem, I run industry-level regressions of average firm 
CAP on the industry concentration ratio whose results I show in Table 6. I see that the 
previous results do not change and that more concentrated industries present more 
average takeover defenses. This relation is both economically and statistically 
significant.  
Overall, up to now all our empirical results are remarkably consistent. I have found that 
there are no efficiency reasons behind corporate anti-take over provisions. On the 
contrary, all the evidence I find is consistent with an agency view in which the only 
purpose of these provisions is defending the managerial selfish interest. Summarizing, 
firms that operate in highly volatile environments allow higher protection to its 
managers; anti-take over corporate provisions is not associated with a higher presence 
of firm-specific organizational capital and therefore the purpose of these provisions can 
not be motivating firm-specific managerial investment; significantly, more anti-take 
over defenses are found in those firms more isolated from the discipline of product 
market competition. Our next results investigate if CAP provide managers the right 
incentives to avoid under investment in long term projects. 
As a first step I study the relation between long-term investments and anti-takeover 
protection. Table 5 shows how there is a robust and statistically significant positive 
                                                 
18 These results are available upon request to the authors.  IE Working Paper                                    WP04/28                                15/10/2004 
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relation between the estimated useful life of company assets and the index of corporate 
governance protection. Companies that allow a larger level of anti-takeover protection 
do indeed have more long run investments. This relationship exists using any of our two 
estimates of useful asset life with and without industry dummies.  
Economically the estimated relation is strikingly strong: An increase of 10 years in 
average useful life of company assets is associated with an increase of around one point 
in the corporate governance index. According to the way GIM constructed the index, 
this increase is equivalent to have one more corporate provision that protects from 
hostile takeovers. More takeover defenses are associated with a larger level of long-term 
investment. Yet this is consistent both with managerial entrenchment and CAP as a 
value-enhancing mechanism as I have discussed in Section 2. 
Next I investigate how the stock market values those companies that invest in long-term 
assets both in the short and in the long run. If stock market is indeed myopic, I should 
observe a two-part phenomenon. First, a penalization for those companies that do invest 
in longer-lived assets when they report the investment. Second, a premium for the same 
companies in the long run corresponding to the extra returns that these companies 
achieve that the stock market did not foresee when the investment was made. 
With this in mind, I follow the following procedure. I take from Compustat information 
of public companies for the period 1950-2002. For those corporations that have been 
public at least five years I compute the estimated useful life of property, plant and 
equipment as it has been explained above. With this I order the sample by year and by 
the current estimated useful life of company assets. From CRSP I take monthly 
corporate stock market returns. Then, I construct a value weighted
19 portfolio of those 
companies belonging to the first quartile with smallest asset useful life and another 
value weighted portfolio of those companies belonging to the fourth quartile with 
largest estimated useful life of the assets.  
Once I have the returns of both portfolios for the twenty-one year period 1982-2002 I 
find their risk-adjusted excess returns. Using the Fama-French (1993) factors
20 I 
estimate the following regression: 
 
t t t t f t Momentum HML SMB MKT r R 4 3 2 1 β β β β α + + + + = −                                      (9) 
 
where Rt is the monthly return of the portfolio, rf is the one month Treasury rate, MKT  
is the excess return on the market, SMB is the average return on the three small 
portfolios minus the average return on the three big portfolios, HML is the average 
return on the two value portfolios minus the average return on the two growth portfolios 
measured using book to market ratios while Momentum is the average return on the two 
high prior return portfolios minus the average return on the two low prior return 
portfolios, for more details on the construction of these four factor see Fama-French 
(1993). 
In the expression depicted in (9) I are exclusively interested in α that measures the risk-
adjusted excess returns of the portfolio. In the first two rows of Table 7 I can see that 
the portfolio of those firms that invest in shorter-lived assets has monthly excess returns 
of around 1.5% while the portfolio of those companies that invest in longer-lived assets 
has neither a premium nor a discount. I interpret these findings as evidence that the 
stock market indeed rewards shorter-term investments. 
                                                 
19 The weights used are the market value at the beginning of the year. 
20 We download the four factors from the Kenneth French web page. IE Working Paper                                    WP04/28                                15/10/2004 
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Next I investigate the second implication of a myopic stock market. For this goal, I 
study if corporations that invest in longer-lived assets indeed have unexpected risk-
adjusted excess returns later in the future. I construct portfolios in a similar way as I 
have described in the paragraph above but now using the quantiles of the distribution of 
the useful life of the company assets three and five years before. For example, at the 
beginning of the year 1995 I construct a portfolio of those corporations that invested in 
longer-lived assets in 1990 and compute their monthly performance in the year 1995. 
For the year 1996 I construct a portfolio of those companies that invested in longer term 
assets in the year 1991 and so on.  
Again, I build portfolios for those companies that invested in longer and also shorter 
lived assets both three and five years before and compute the α in expression (9). The 
results are shown in the last four rows of Table 7. The important result is that 
corporations that invested in longer-lived assets in the past do not present unexpected 
risk-adjusted excess returns
21in the future. Therefore, I reject the myopic stock market 
hypothesis and I conclude that the positive relation between estimated useful life of 
company assets and CAP that I have reported in Table 5 is due to managerial 
entrenchment and empire building corporate policies rather than value-enhancing 
devices to maximize long-term shareholder￿s wealth. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
We have tested and rejected two possible efficiency reasons that could explain why 
firms introduce corporate anti-takeover provisions: a) To promote firm-specific 
managerial investments b) to provide managers the right incentives to maximize long 
term shareholder￿s wealth by isolating them from the pressures of a myopic stock 
market. In addition Fahlenbrach (2003) reports that CAP is not associated with lower 
but higher total managerial compensation. Furthermore, I have shown that competition 
in the product market limits significatively the degree of takeover defenses that 
corporations can allow to their management team. Overall, all the evidence points out to 
interpret CAP as a managerial entrenchment device and not as a corporate-value-
enhancing mechanism. This result is consistent with the findings of previous literature. 
The main limitation of this empirical study, as in many others, is the issue of causality. 
For instance, do corporate anti-takeover provisions induce managers to invest less in 
organizational capital or companies with lower organizational capital are more likely to 
adopt takeover defenses? Given the nature of the data I cannot address this problem 
properly. For example I cannot introduce firm fixed effects since the variability of 
corporate anti-takeover provisions through time is small. Future work should try to 
correct this problem searching for the right instruments to control for this endogeneity 
problem. 
 
                                                 
21 In non-reported results we find that a stock market premium does not exist either if we study the stock 
market performance of those companies that invested in longer-lived assets even ten years before. IE Working Paper                                    WP04/28                                15/10/2004 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics. The Governance Index corresponds to the year 2002. The rest of 
the variables correspond to the year 2001. 
 
  Mean Std  N 
Governance Index  9.06  2.66  1700 
Measure of Organizational Capital 1
1  1.87 1.42  1700 
Measure of Organizational Capital 2
2  1.09 0.50  1697 
Asset_life_1
3  7.88 5.31  1204 
Asset_life_2
4  7.81 4.49  1190 
Sales
5   4400  12873  1700 
ROA
6  0.09 0.14  1700 
Herfindhal Index
7  0.19 0.21  1691 
Volatility
8  0.45 0.21  1466 
Market to book  1.44  1.53  1700 
R&D to sales  0.28  1.58  923 
 
1Organizational Capital measured as the exponential of the average across time of the 
residual of a regression that has Company Market Value in logs on the left hand side 
while on the right hand side has Book Value in logs, Industry Dummies at  the four-
digit SIC code level and year dummies. See more details in the text. 
2 Organizational Capital measured as the exponential of the average across time of the 
residual of a regression that has Company Sales in logs on the left hand side while on 
the right hand side has Asset Book Value, Employment, both in logs, Industry Dummies 
at  the four-digit SIC code level and year dummies. See more details in the text. 
3Asset·s useful life of company property, plant and equipment. I measure it by first 
computing the total number of years I need to add company capital expenditures (data30 
in Compustat) to get the gross book value of property, plant and equipment (data8 in 
Compustat) for every given year. Second I take the in-company average across years. 
This average is the measure of useful life of company assets. I exclude from the sample 
all firms that have less than five observations in Compustat. 
4Asset·s useful life of company property, plant and equipment. I measured it by first 
computing the total number of years I need to add year variations in the net value of 
property, plant and equipment (data7 in Compustat) and depreciation of tangibles (data  
in Compustat ?) until I get the gross book value of property, plant and equipment (data8 
in Compustat) for every given year. Second I take the in-company average across years. 
This average is the measure of useful life of company assets. I exclude from the sample 
all firms that have less than five observations in Compustat 
5Company sales in $ millions.   
6Rate of return on Assets measured as Operating Income before Depreciation over 
Assets (Book Value).  
7 Herfindhal-Hirschman Index computed at the four-digit SIC level using Compustat 
segment data. See the text for details. 
8Industry volatility computed as the weighted average of company volatility in the last 
60 months.  IE Working Paper                                    WP04/28                                15/10/2004 
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Table 2: Preliminary regressions needed to find proxy measures of organizational 
capital. The total sample includes all active and inactive Companies in Compustat for 
the 20-year period of 1982-2002. I exclude all firms that do not have at least five years 
of information. Both regressions include Year Dummies as well as Industry Dummies at 
the four-digit SIC industry level. 
 
  Dependent Variable = Market 
Value














2  0.80 0.92 
Observations 135,463  136,911 
 
 
1Price of the stock at the end of the year (data24 in Compustat Annual File) multiplied 
by the Number of Common Shares Outstanding (data25) 
2 Log of Data12 in Compustat Annual File.
 
3Log of Data 6 in Compustat Annual File 
4Log of Total Number of Firm Employees. 
. 
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Table 3: Example of estimation of useful life of assets. Assumption that economic life 
is equal to five years and equal to the accounting useful life. 
 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995  1996 
I 10  20  0  10  5  5  10 
GBV  10 30 30 40 45 50-10=40  50-20=30 
D
0    2 2 2 2 2  - 
D
1  -   4 4 4 4  4 
D
2 - - - - - -  - 
D
3 - - -   2 2  2 
D
4 - - - -   1  1 
D
5 - - - - -   3 
D
6 - - - - - -   
D    2 6 6 8 9  10 
AD   2  8 14  22  31-10=21  31-20=11 
NBV  10 28 22 26 23 19  19 
∆NBV -  18  -6  4  -3  -4  0 
est.  I   18+2  -6+6  4+6  -3+8  -4+9 0+10 
 
where I is Investment in new equipment, GBV is gross book value of assets, D
i is 
annual depreciation of assets bought in year 199i. D is total annual Depreciation, NBV 
is net book value of the assets while est I accounts for the estimated investment in new 
assets according to Lewellen-Badrinath algorithm 
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Table 4: Regression of Governance Index upon both industry and company 
characteristics. The Governance Index variable corresponds to the year 2002 while all 
independent variables have their values corresponding to the year 2001. 
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5    1.12
*** 
(0.38)    1.10
*** 




6    -0.86
*** 
(0.31)    -0.93
*** 




2  0.31 0.08 0.31 0.08 0.31 0.07 
Observations  1700 1466 1698 1466 1700 1480 
 
1Organizational Capital measured as the average across time of the residual of a 
regression that has Company Market Value in logs on the left hand side while on the 
right hand side has Book Value in logs, Industry Dummies at  the four-digit SIC code 
level and year dummies. See more details in the text. 
2  Organizational Capital measured as the average across time of the residual of a 
regression that has Company Sales in logs on the left hand side while on the right hand 
side has Asset Book Value, Employment, both in logs, Industry Dummies at  the four-
digit SIC code level and year dummies. See more details in the text. 
3Log of company sales. 
4Rate of return on Assets measured as Operating Income before Depreciation over 
Assets (Book Value).  
5 Herfindhal-Hirschman Index computed at the four-digit SIC level using Compustat 
segment data. See the text for details. 
6Industry volatility computed as the weighted average of company volatility in the last 
60 months. See the text for details. 
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Table 5: Regression of Governance Index upon both industry and company 
characteristics. The Governance Index variable corresponds to the year 2002 while all 
independent variables have their values corresponding to the year 2001. The columns 
with the heading ￿Industry dummies￿ reports regression with industry dummies at the 
four digit SIC code. 
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6    1.44
*** 




7    -0.10
*** 




2  0.42 0.13 0.40 0.12 
Observations 1199  1039  1183  1039 
 
 
1Organizational Capital measured as the average across time of the residual of a 
regression that has Company Market Value in logs on the left hand side while on the 
right hand side has Book Value in logs, Industry Dummies at the four-digit SIC code 
level and year dummies. See more details in the text. 
2Log of company sales. 
3Rate of return on assets measured as operating income before depreciation over assets 
(Book Value). 
4Asset·s useful life of company property, plant and equipment computed using time 
series of property, plant and equipment investments. See note 3 in Table I. 
5Asset·s useful life of company property, plant and equipment computed reconstructing 
the series of company investments using the Lewellen-Badrinath algorithm. See note 4 
in Table I. 
6 Herfindhal-Hirschman Index computed at the four-digit SIC level using Compustat 
segment data. See the text for details. 
7Industry volatility computed as the weighted average of company volatility in the last 
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Table 6: Industry level regressions of the mean industry Governance index  on 












Log of Industry Size    0.00 
(0.07) 
R
2  0.03 0.03 
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Table 7: Stock market evaluation of long term versus short-term investment 
 
 
Each row shows the result of a regression with monthly returns of different portfolios minus the risk free 
rate (one month Treasury bill rate) as dependent variable and the Fama-French factors as independent 
variables. The period studied is 1982-2002 and therefore each regression has 252 observations. α 
represents the abnormal excess returns 
1 MKT  is the excess return on the market. It is calculated as the value-weight return on 
all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks (from CRSP) minus the one-month Treasury 
bill rate. See Fama-French (1993). 
2 Small stock returns minus big stock returns, SMB, is the average return on the three 
small portfolios minus the average return on the three big portfolios. See Fama-French 
(1993). 
3 HML (High Minus Low) is the average return on the two value portfolios minus the   
average return on the two growth portfolios measured using book to market ratios. See 
Fama-French (1993). 
4 Up Minus Down) is the average return on the two high prior return portfolios minus 
the average return on the two low prior return portfolios, for more details see  Fama-
French (1993). 
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